#64 – The Price Disciple
SUMMARY
This month’s guest is Tobias Carlisle, one of the best-known advocates of deep value investing, author of several investing books and host of a great investing podcast which he produces live on YouTube. We talk about how he got into investing, having been a lawyer, why people worry too much about value traps but not enough about quality traps and how the podcast has influenced his thinking. We discuss his latest book, which includes an examination of what he regards as Buffett’s three best deals and why he has moved from the extreme “junk” end of deep value. He remains valuation-driven but is now more willing to own quality when he can obtain it at the right price.
Some takeaways
Getting into Investing
Toby explains how practising corporate law during the dot-com collapse exposed him to activist investors, busted IPOs and private-equity transactions. Watching buyers construct complicated leveraged deals while comparable listed companies could sometimes be bought more cheaply helped shape his investment philosophy, and took him into investing.
The Acquirers Multiple
Why cheap and unpopular can still work
Many former proponents of value investing have migrated towards higher quality stocks and compounders. Toby is not against quality oif itself, but he is highly motibvated by price – he has owned quality stcoks like Meta and Booking Holdings, but only when they have been deeply unfashionable and very lowly rated. He argues that an inferior business bought at a sufficiently large discount can still make an excellent investment. This is an increasingly unfashionable corner of the market after a long period of outperformance by growth and dominance by larger caps. But Toby argues that value’s time is coming again.
Value traps and quality traps
Toby argues that it’s not really possible to distinguish a temporarily troubled company from one in terminal decline, the so-called value trap. His solution is valuation discipline and diversification rather than pretending that he can forecast perfectly. He thinks that the value trap question is overused and that there is just as much risk in overpaying for a supposedly quality company that lets you down. He calls this a quality trap. At least if you buy a low quality company cheaply, you may not get a positive surprise about its resilience or growth, but you haven’t paid much for it.
Is investing about avoiding mistakes?
Toby believes that roughly 30 holdings is a sensible level for many portfolios. He runs a small and micro-cap strategy where the individual stocks can be highly volatile and where liquidity is also limited so in his small cap portfolios he tends to have 100 names. He argues that being wrong is inevitable – the important thing is ensuring that individual errors cannot destroy the portfolio. He is also sceptical about applying Kelly-style concentration too literally.
Buffett’s 3 best Deals?
In his new book, Toby analyses three of what may be Warren Buffett’s greatest deals. The Japanese trading companies are well-known and simple to analyse. The other two deals are unusual in that Berkshire issued stock, something Mr Buffett has generally been loathe to do. Toby explained that the genius of the Gen Re deal was that at the time Coca Cola was a huge holding for Berkshire and was trading at a huge multiple. An overlooked benefit of the Gen Re deal was that it allowed Berkshire to dilute the influence of Coca Cola. Of course, Berkshire’s own stock was highly valued, there was industrial logic to the transaction and Gen Re’s holdings of bonds provided valuable defensive firepower.
BNSF was another deal in which Berkshire issued stock to reduce leverage and to win over retail holders. At the time, smart money generally understood that the railroads were undergoing a transformation and would see returns inflect – for example, TCI had taken a stake in CSX and were pressing for change; as a result, the stocks had already been partially rerated in anticipation.
But the real genius of Mr Buffett was to recognise that 10 years down the road, Berkshire’s industrial subsidiaries would be much more cash generative and hence the addition of a capital hungry giant like BNSF would provide a safe and secure home for the extra cash being thrown off, without forcing Berkshire into doing more acquisitions or further increasing its cash pile. This benefit has not been fully appreciated by all Berkshire commentators.
About Tobias Carlisle
Tobias Carlisle is an investor, author, and the founder, CIO and managing director of Acquirers Funds, LLC, where he manages deep value strategies and exchange-traded funds (ETFs) such as ZIG and DEEP. Toby has had a varied career, including having worked as an analyst at an activist hedge fund, as general counsel for an Australian listed company, and as a corporate advisory and M&A lawyer.
Toby now lives in southern California with his wife and three kids and somehow still manages to find the time to write books. His earlier work includes Quantitative Value (2012), Deep Value (2014), Concentrated Investing (2016), and The Acquirer’s Multiple (2017). In late 2025, he published Soldier of Fortune: Warren Buffett, Sun Tzu and the Ancient Art of Risk-Taking
Published in late 2025, the book explores how the timeless military and strategic principles from Sun Tzu’s The Art of War can be applied directly to modern deep-value investing. Specifically, Carlisle examines how legendary investor Warren Buffett embodies these ancient ideas—such as achieving victory without active conflict, maintaining invincibility, and practicing the disciplined avoidance of ruin Toby graduated from the University of Queensland in Australia with degrees in Law (2001) and Business (Management) (1999).

BOOKS
When a guest has written a book, we normally don’t ask them for a recommendation.
Toby’s latest book is Soldier of Fortune: Warren Buffett, Sun Tzu and the Ancient Art of Risk-Taking. Published in late 2025, the book explores how the timeless military and strategic principles from Sun Tzu’s The Art of War can be compared to deep-value investing. Carlisle examines how legendary investor Warren Buffett embodies many of these ancient ideas, such as achieving victory without active conflict, maintaining invincibility, and practising the disciplined avoidance of ruin. In the book, Toby examines some of the master’s key deals, including Gen Re, BNSF and the Japanese trading houses.

Get it on Amazon and donate to our featured charity.
Toby has also written several other books of which the best known is The Acquirer’s Multiple: How the Billionaire Contrarians of Deep Value Beat the Market. This is an explanation of his deep value philosophy and shows how investors Warren Buffett, Carl Icahn, David Einhorn and Dan Loeb got started and how they do it. The book has been incredibly popular.

Get it on Amazon and donate to our featured charity.
How Steve Knows the Guest
Steve reached out to a number of podcasters when he launched his book and Toby was the first to agree to have Steve on his podcast which was a massive help in getting the word out. Steve then interviewed Toby on Real Vision and they finally met, by accident, in the bar of the Hilton after the Berkshire AGM, thanks to Stuart, who is a friend of Toby (they grew up together or at least in the same town) and of Steve. They had dinner together more recently in Omaha and Steve has appeared again on Toby’s podcast which is now broadcast live.
Thanks to our Sponsors
AlphaSense, the AI-powered expert network platform
Baseline, qualitative research on 3600 companies.
Give our sponsors some love – check them out!
Chapters
00:00 – Host Introduction and Tobias Carlisle’s Path to Investing
04:15 – Tobias Carlisle’s Approach to Deep Value Investing and Market Cycles
11:23 – How to Identify and Avoid Both Value and Quality Traps
14:42 – Applying Sun Tzu’s Strategy to Buffett’s Investing Philosophy
26:06 – Diversification and Sizing Strategies to Avoid Catastrophic Losses
31:55 – Unpacking Warren Buffett’s Masterful Gen Re and BNSF Acquisitions
41:03 – Analysing Buffett’s Japanese Trading Houses and Apple Investments
48:22 – How Tobias Carlisle’s Investing Philosophy Embraced Quality
53:59 – Tobias on Podcast Production and Non-Investment Literary Influences
Transcript
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: Hi, I’m Steve Clapham and welcome to the Behind the Balance Sheet podcast where we meet leading investors and commentators and educate ourselves about the world of investing and the world. Our mission is to remove some of the mystique around investing and improve our understanding of successful investors’ strategies and tactics.
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: Behind the Balance Sheet is an investment training consultancy. We help professional investors up their game in financial analysis. And we have an online school. Over a thousand students, professional and amateur, have taken our courses.
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: Our flagship Analyst Academy helped one young analyst land a dream job as a partner of a major London hedge fund and helped another, a successful entrepreneur, improve his investing confidence. He made a seven-figure sum in year one.
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: Check out the school on our website, BehindTheBalanceGee. Com, where you can also find the show notes to this podcast. And while you’re there, don’t forget, sign up for our popular and free weekly sub stack. Hit the sign up button on the top right of the homepage. Most AI tools today are very good at sounding right.
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: The summary is clean, but can you actually trace it back to the filing, the transcript, the specific passage that drove the answer? Or are you just trusting the confidence of the output? For investors, that’s not a minor concern.
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: A missed filing, a mis-weighted source, context that got lost somewhere in the retrieval chain, those aren’t edge cases, they’re how decisions go wrong. AlphaSense is the AI platform built specifically for this. They own the content over 5% of the 100 million curated documents from broker research and expert transcripts to filings and earnings calls, and they own the retrieval layer on top of it.
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: That means every answer links back to an exact verifiable source, because the answer is only as good as what’s underneath it, and with AlphaSense you know exactly what that is. See it for yourself. A free trial at alpha-sense.com.
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: Forward slash BTBS that’s alpha alpha hyphen sense dot com forward slash BTBS or behind the Balance Sheet my guest today is Tobias Carlisle one of the best known advocates of deep value investing and someone i’ve known for a number of years his style of investing has had a difficult stretch for well over 15 years now but he thinks the pendulum may finally be ready to swing back which is interesting because he hasn’t been saying that.
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: His latest book, Soldier of Fortune, draws a really interesting parallel between Warren Buffett and Sun Tzu. Successful investing is less about maximizing your gains than making sure you never suffer catastrophic losses. We discussed that idea Why Toby thinks investors worry about value traps but forget about quality traps. How many stocks you really need in a portfolio.
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: And we explore three of Toby’s favorite Buffett transactions, Genri, BNSF, and Japanese trading houses. Toby explains why Buffett issued stock to buy Genri and the real genius behind the BNSF purchase. We also discuss AI, Berkshire’s more recent moves, and why Torby, who historically has been happy to buy an average or even a poor business, as long as the price was right, has changed his own thinking about quality.
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: So Toby, hi, welcome to the podcast. It’s great to be in touch with you again. I haven’t seen you since Omaha last year. We had dinner, but we haven’t done this on my podcast. We’ve done an interview on Real Vision before, and I always start by asking people, did you always want to be an investor. You know, where are you like Warren Buffett?
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: Collecting your newspaper round money and investing it into the hot stuff of the day. But I know that’s not true of you because you were actually an M&A lawyer, which probably sounds more profitable than being a value investor these days. What made you quit law and get into investing? Was there a single thing? What happened?
TOBIAS CARLISLE: Yeah, I grew up in a little country town where I didn’t know that anybody could be an investor. That wasn’t a job that anybody did. It’s not really a job.
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: It’s certainly not a job the way our mutual friend, Stuart, operates it.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: And then I went to university in the capital city of the state where I grew up in Australia, in Queensland. I went to university in University Of Queensland, studied law, came out and practiced law. While we were, I had been reading Buffett at university. I’d read. Someone gave me security analysis, the original like 1934 edition. A friend of mine, he likes classical literature.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: He was like, the richest man in the world owns an insurance company. And I thought, well, that sounds pretty boring. I don’t want to do that. And he said, but he’s an investor and he describes what he does in these letters that you can read online for free. So I I read the letters and it made sense. And at the same time, I was…
TOBIAS CARLISLE: Working in corporate law, which at the time, this was early 2000s, I started on the day of the tech wreck, the day that the tech wreck began. I didn’t really know. I wasn’t really focused on that stuff, but the stock market fell over. Tech stocks got blown up. I was already thinking as a value guy because I’d read the security analysis, particularly the chapters on liquidation value and stuff like that.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: Part of that period of time was a lot of old activists from the 80s came back and were targeting these cash box busted IPOs where they had some dot-com that had a terrible business strategy.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: You know what they say, like they’re all losing a dollar on every sale and making it up in volume. But they did have like big amounts of cash on their Balance Sheet. And so I was in the Buffett sort of… Buy the wonderful company that fair price philosophy. And I was watching these guys buy these companies that were losing cash. And like, why do they want these things?
TOBIAS CARLISLE: Of course, because they can get the cash and you don’t have to run the business. So they would get control of the cash box and shoot the business and then use the cash box to Acquire another one or liquidate it. And so I thought that was kind of an interesting approach to investing.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: And I realized that these guys were, they had previously been corporate raiders, but now they were calling themselves activists. And it was sort of the activist boom. And I’d spent a lot of time as activist defense, which is when you act for a big company to defend against activists from the outside. And at the same time, there was this LBO boom was starting to pick up. Leverage buyouts were private equity was sort of.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: Interesting again, because things were cheap enough. So we would act for these private equity firms that would buy these businesses, load them up with debt and try and make a return out of that. And I could see the prices that they were paying for these businesses. And then I could see the same business listed on the stock exchange for cheaper.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: And so I could see these guys, you know, and there’s a lot of work when you, there’s a lot of paper when you take something private, you know, you got to. Take it off the stock exchange and you’ve got a paper all of the capital structure. You’ve got the bank debt and the subordinated debt and the mezzanine debt and the equity holders.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: And they’ve all got options and warrants. And there’s a whole lot of stuff going on in the back end. So it’s a nightmare. It’s a, you know, it’s then it was hundreds and hundreds of thousands of dollars of legals to create this structure. And then one of the ones that they did, I saw them create this bus line. And at the same time, there was this airline price war going on.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: So nobody wanted to take a bus when you could fly much more cheaply. And so the bus fell over. And then the bus acquisition fell over, the bus leverage buyout. And so they had this rule that if you worked on the front end, you worked on the back end as well. And so I sort of picked apart this thing in liquidation, this disaster.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: You could buy cheaper stocks on the stock market. And so I thought, why would you go to all of the trouble of taking this thing private? You can load it up with debt and you can get a slightly better return out of that. But you can engineer the same deal yourself on the stock market for less.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: And if you believe this Buffett idea, that Graham idea, if you believe in value investing, that buying something cheaper than paying a lower price is better than paying a higher price, you can buy these things for a lower price. And if you’re wrong… You just tip it out the next day, you press a button and it’s all gone. Whereas for a private equity transaction, that’s a nightmare to fix up.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: So I became interested in that part of the market where you’re not necessarily buying the best businesses, but you’re getting discounted businesses. And it’s sort of a little bit of a lost art a little bit. It’s not really the way that most people… Practice value investing these days.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: I think most people sort of think of it as you only buy high quality. Because if you don’t buy quality, the business just doesn’t work. And so there’s a whole lot of people hunting in this compound equality part of the world and paying very high prices for it. And that less good business but a very cheap price can still be a very good way of investing.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: And that’s basically, there just aren’t very many practitioners or certainly no one who will own up to it anymore. And so that’s the part of the area that I’ve… Market that I target now. And I think there’s reasonably good research to back up that that is a good part of the market to be.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: And it’s just that we’re in these very long cycles where bigger, growthier stocks have sort of outperformed for an extended period of time. And so small value has really been left behind. But I think that the pendulum has perhaps swung too far in one direction. And in the stock market, it tends to swing back. The other direction. So I feel pretty good.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: I like this part of the market that I’m in. And it’s a part of the market that I’ve been in for a very long period of time. I’ve been doing it for 26 years now. So I’m ready for the recovery. I’ve seen a pretty good decade for this style of investing, a pretty bad 16 years for this style of investing. So I think we’re probably back to it.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: Early 2000s.
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: Well, it certainly has a number of parallels with the late 90s and early 2000s. Hard to know exactly where you are. But the problem with what you do is you’re basically, your strategy is to buy companies that everybody else hates. And the real trick with that is how you work at a company where the problems are temporary? And a company that’s in structural decline. And that’s difficult, isn’t it? I mean, how do you do that?
TOBIAS CARLISLE: That really is the multi-million dollar question.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: In some respects, I don’t think you can know prospectively. I don’t think you know which ones are in terminal decline and which ones aren’t. I think they all look the same. I think that it’s really only obvious in hindsight. And so you have to think about how you address that problem. If you can’t predict the future, which I can’t.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: And I think that the way that you do it is by spreading your bets a little bit. You’ve got to be diversified. I think you need to be diversified across industries. And I think you need to be diversified across strategies a little bit too. So I think even within the deep value discipline, you can buy better businesses.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: So I have a lot of businesses in the portfolio and I have owned businesses in the past. I’ve bought Meta in the past when it got really beaten up. The first time Zuck went into the Metaverse and then sold out of it when it recovered. I have Booking.com right now, which is an online travel agent.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: It’s been a very good business and it’s either temporarily distressed or it’s going to be totally… Folks aren’t flying as much, or it’s permanently impaired because we’re all going to search for flights using AI. And so many of these questions, I think they’re sort of existential questions.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: I don’t know prospectively what the correct answer is there, but if you look at the financialsofbooking.com on a historical basis, and you assume that it continues to function the same way into the future, then you’re getting a big discount right now on that valuation. And so If the market’s wrong, if the narrative’s wrong, then we run back to value.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: If the narrative’s right, then I think it tends to be more of a slower moving beast and we’ve already got our discount. So we’re a little bit protected on the downside. And so that’s sort of my approach. I don’t think you can prospectively identify value traps. We also don’t talk about quality traps. Like the quality trap is a real thing too, where people just overpay for growth that doesn’t ever manifest.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: And so there’s always this risk. You either overpay for growth that doesn’t show up, for quality that’s not there, for certainty that’s not there, or you overpay for a business that’s not going to recover. You have to be somewhere in the middle. Now, I still think it’s a handicapping type race, not pick the winner.
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: No, no, sure. It’s interesting because Jonathan Tapper was on the podcast, which I think we published in February, and he owns Booking.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: He’s a Booking guy, yeah.
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: And he only owns 16. When we recorded he only owned 16 stocks so he’s got quite a lot of it and you know he was just saying well It kind of doesn’t matter because they’re buying back their stock. It’s a very cash-generated business. They don’t have a huge amount in CapEx.
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: And they’re just allocating the capital to buying back their own stock when it’s lowly rated. So they’ll engineer the growth. And interestingly, I saw the Skyscanner CTO interviewed at London Tech Week last week. And he was just saying, when somebody said to him, oh, well, you’re going to be…
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: Intermediated disintermediated by open AI just laughed he said you know the the prices of airfares change every minute you know and there’s no you know their database is millions millions millions this is not the easiest problem to solve and it’s probably not the highest up on sam altman’s quite busy inbox and we’ll see i mean you know this is really impossible to predict because of course we’re so early in AI and these sas type stocks it’s i think it’s very understandable why people have thrown them out why own them when you you know why take the risk when they’re they’ve been on high valuations but taking the risk when they’re low valuations i completely i completely get that so the business It’s called Acquirer’s Funds.
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: You wrote this great book, The Acquirer’s Multiple. Do you want to just explain a little bit about that philosophy? Because it’s quite an interesting philosophy. And it goes back to what you were saying about the private equity.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: Yeah, I’ve read Buffett’s letters for a long time, many, many times. And I’ve also read The Art Of War. Many, many times when I was in high school, I read it. I’ve read it probably every five years after I left high school. And people have always said, oh, it’s got this reputation as being this sort of brilliant book on strategy.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: And I just couldn’t get it. I read it lots and lots of times. And I thought it’s like an emperor’s new clothes thing. Like everybody says, oh, yeah, the emperor’s got great clothes. But I just couldn’t see them. And then in the pandemic. I turned 40, I had little kids, everything was, the business was struggling, the pandemic looked to be, you know, the virus looked to be pretty scary.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: And I read Sun Tzu again in that, and just for whatever reason, that I was primed for the message in The Art Of War. And I realized that what Sun Tzu was writing about was very similar to the message that I had read repeatedly in Buffett, which is basically that.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: You need to avoid the risk of ruin. You need to avoid ruin. And that’s how The Art Of War opens. It says you need to think about this strategy and recognize that there are two parts here. And one takes you to safety and one takes you to ruin. And if you follow this path of safety, then it opens up the possibility of winning and doing all these other things. And if you follow…
TOBIAS CARLISLE: This path of ruin then at some point you’re going to lose and that’s basically what Buffett is saying as well don’t do anything that risks the entire enterprise don’t do anything that risks blowing up and then Buffett has sort of described what these qualities are in a business context and they mirror what Sun Tzu has described in a sort of military context or in a strategy context and so i just found the parallels between the two Basically, it’s that you need to think about defense, which is in a business context, that’s a Balance Sheet analysis, that’s a business analysis, that’s various other things.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: Then you need to be only putting on positions where Sun Tzu has this idea that you don’t enter into a conflict until you know how it’s going to work out. We would say in an investing context, you shouldn’t do anything unless you have an edge.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: So how do you define your edge? Many people would say it’s superior business analysis. I think you need to do business analysis for sure. I think that that’s important. You need to understand what kind of business you’re looking at and you need to understand the way that that will behave through a business cycle.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: So there are lots of businesses that they’re a little bit like Taleb’s Turkey. They do very well for lots and lots of years and then they have a catastrophic loss at one point and you just need to understand that that’s what’s being discounted in the stock. Or they’re cyclical businesses, or there are lots of different types of businesses out there, and you need to understand what it is that you’re engaging with.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: And then that dictates what is an appropriate valuation, what sort of discount you require to consider one of those positions. So the thing that would distinguish me from most investors, or most value investors these days, is they would say, you would only look at the best quality, because that’s what Buffett says, only by the wonderful companies at fair prices.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: I would say, I care less about the absolute quality of the business and more about the discount that I’m getting. So I would buy a coal mine that’s in, I don’t know if it’s terminal decline, but let’s assume that it’s terminal decline because there’s ESG narratives that don’t, ESG mandates that don’t want any more coal mines.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: And there’s some suggestion that that’s like the whole business is going away, but maybe these businesses, it’s going to be hard to open new coal mines. It’s going to be hard to expand existing coal mines. But those existing coal mines are probably going to cash flow until the end of their useful life.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: And so there’s a price that you can pay for those things that will generate reasonably good returns. And so I think there’s a lot of messages in Sun Tzu and Buffett that sort of mirror each other. And for me, they just sort of help tease out some of those ideas. And then I look for those… Make sure that the positions that I’m putting on have those.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: This is sort of a natural thing for value investors to do, that you’re looking for a mispricing. So you have a business that has, you think it’s worth something, the market offers it to you at a different price, and the gap between those two, that’s your margin of safety. You need a bigger margin of safety for a more cyclical type of business.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: I think that all of these things are well-known by value investors. Perhaps not as obvious from the outside. So I just tried to find a framework that helped sort of explain what Buffett was doing. And then I picked three of his sort of iconic deals that I felt were a little bit misunderstood and tried to explain them in that context.
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: How do you find the time to write a book, another book? I mean, this is like your fifth book or sixth book?
TOBIAS CARLISLE: Yeah, I enjoy it. It’s how I think. I just sort of, I don’t really know what I think. I think I read Buffett somewhere said he doesn’t really know what he thinks about something until he writes it down. And I sort of feel the same way a little bit too. It’s interesting how many ideas you can kill just by writing them down.
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: Baseline is an equity research tool and screening system, but not your standard system which simply sorts financial data. Instead, Baseline scores 3,600 companies on more than 30 qualitative fields. Fields like pricing power, barriers to switching, mission criticality, management quality, AI exposure, and more.
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: Importantly, A 4 out of 5 in pricing power carries the same meaning for a US software leader and an Indian industrial. What this allows you to do is to screen on qualitative traits, like low pricing power and high AI risk, or founder-led names with accounting red flags. None of these filters exist on a conventional screen. Every field carries an analyst-grade write-up explaining why the score above.
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: And the score below were rejected. That represents days of desk work per name already done before you even open the page. There are no prompts to engineer, no waiting 20 minutes for a run, no hallucinations, and no coverage gaps discovered after the fact. Baseline covers the compute costs and rents the platform to users.
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: Importantly, the measures are all relative. If you ask, Does ASML have… Pricing power? A chatbot will simply say yes. But Baseline says it’s a 4 out of 5 because of X, Y, and Z. Baseline is available to private investors and to funds. Private users pay a simple monthly cost.
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: Funds access the standard system but can get custom features built on top to suit their specific needs. New coverage, fields, and other tools. To learn more about Baseline, visit B-I-T-spot-L-Y-forward-slash-B-T-B-S-base-1. That’s B-T-B-S for behind the Balance Sheet, base, and the number one. Are you a professional investor? How many 10-Ks and annual reports do you look at in a year?
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: Ever wished you could cut through the noise and process them faster and more effectively? We run a forensic accounting course for larger institutional clients in their offices. For smaller investment funds and individuals, We also do them in person in London and New York and over Zoom. Email us at info at behindthebalancesheet.com for more details.
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: Most AI tools today are very good at sounding right. The summary is clean, but can you actually trace it back to the filing, the transcript, the specific passage that drove the answer? Or are you just trusting the confidence of the output? For investors, that’s not a minor concern. A missed filing, a misweighted source.
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: Context that got lost somewhere in the retrieval chain, those aren’t edge cases, they’re how decisions go wrong. AlphaSense is the AI platform built specifically for this. They own the content, over 500 million curated documents from broker research and expert transcripts to filings and earnings calls, and they own the retrieval layer on top of it.
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: That means every answer links back. To an exact verifiable source. Because the answer is only as good as what’s underneath it. And with AlphaSense, you know exactly what that is. See it for yourself. Get a free trial at alpha-sense.com forward slash BTBS. That’s alpha-sense.com forward slash BTBS. We’re behind the Balance Sheet.
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: One of the themes is sort of avoiding catastrophe. Strife by rather than sort of maximizing your gains and i mean what do you think i mean Buffett appears to prefer errors of omission over errors of commission do you think investing is really about avoiding mistakes rather than trying to make money i do it depends on the type of mistake though i think that the there.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: Are obvious mistakes that you can make overpaying for too high quality is an obvious mistake that you can make buying a value trap maybe that’s an obvious mistake that you can make maybe it’s a i would say that you can get priced into anything i think that there’s a a bad business at the right price is is is not a mistake even if ultimately it turns out to be a mistake you know that’s that’s one of the i i i struggle with this idea a little bit but there are you’re going to be wrong on lots of just by virtue of the fact that nobody can foresee the future and often the market is right.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: And so I think that having that valuation discipline helps you avoid them, but you just want to make sure that when you’re wrong, it’s not catastrophic for the portfolio. And that’s a size in question. Also sizing into the styles of businesses. You don’t want to size into something that has catastrophic downside. You want to have a big holding of something that has a catastrophic downside.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: You want to spread your bets. So I think that all of these ideas are just directed to the best of your ability. Look at the Balance Sheet. Look at the cash flows. Figure out if the business is actually going to survive in the first instance. And then if it can survive, then all the good things that can happen from just survival eventually.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: Many of these businesses that were counted out over the last five or 10 years have come roaring back. And it’s been kind of amazing to watch, particularly the I mean, they’re very hot now, but the semis have been deep value stocks many, many times. They’re cyclical, so they’re hard to value. I think everybody’s forgotten that they’re cyclical. They run up like they’re going to come back.
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: They’ll be reminded pretty soon.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: And I have owned them on and off over the years. I don’t know what the track record is like in them particularly, but I think that sort of… Valuation discipline, looking at the nature of the business, the Balance Sheet, all those sort of things can help you avoid catastrophic mistakes.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: And then if you have some sizing discipline and some diversification discipline over the top of that, then I think that you kind of muddle your way through. And I think that even though you’re going to have mistakes, you’re going to be okay.
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: How many positions do you need to have to minimize that risk then?
TOBIAS CARLISLE: Well, I wrote a book called Concentrated Investing where we looked at exactly that. We looked at the academic answer, which is the academics are driving a different question. They’re trying to replicate the market with as few stocks as possible. And so they’re assuming a random walk. And they say, you know, they are 20, you’ve diversified like 90% of your non-diversifiable risk.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: Or your diversifiable risk, I’m sorry. And at 30, it’s like 95%. And then names beyond that don’t really add much.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: The value guys have come out anywhere between, I think Graham said 30.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: And then, of course, Buffett and Munger preferred like a Kelly betting approach where you size up. I’ve got some criticism of the Kelly approach in the book, which is just that you don’t have the mathematical certainty that Kelly seems to warrant. And also Kelly is designed to be applied in series rather than… Parallel. So the idea is that you’re sitting at the blackjack table, seeing one hand after another.
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: Yeah.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: And that’s how you size for Kelly. Whereas when you’re investing, you’ve got an entire universe of investments that you can put on at any one time and they all have a positive expected return. So they should all have some small size in the portfolio, depending on the size of their expected return. And so that would necessarily size down. It would be hard to imagine that you could have a…
TOBIAS CARLISLE: 40% position, which lots of these value guys who use this stuff end up with at inception, because you’re just not properly accounting for all of the other positive expected returns out there, which should be collectively put in there. So I think the outcome of all of that is that the intuition of the older value investors is probably right, that 30 is about the right number.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: But I do think that it depends a little bit on the nature of the thing that you’re investing in. So I have 100 in my small and micro ETF deep because those businesses are much smaller. They’re much more volatile. Even at 100 names, that portfolio is much more volatile than my mid-large cap 30-name strategy because they tend to trade. I don’t know whether it’s the indexes or why it is, but they’re up and down.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: Like two or three times the the mid-large cap portfolio collectively as a portfolio and the individual names inside move like.
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: 15 20 on any given day it’s amazing that’s just a liquidity thing though right likely yes that’s just crossing the bid ask spread in the book the your new soldier fortune book you you discussed three deals general ray the NSF and the Japanese trading houses, which you think are Buffett’s best deals.
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: They’re not the generally recognized deals. Gen Re was very early, so most people won’t be familiar with it. And the reason it’s interesting is because he used his own stock, which was overpriced. Do you want to just say a little bit about that and why you think it was such a good deal?
TOBIAS CARLISLE: I had been reading Buffett for about a year or so. By the time that deal came along. And if you read the letters, he talks about, you want these capital-like compounders is where you get to high return on equity, protected high return on equity, and a fair price, he would say.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: And then he does Gen Re, which looked expensive optically from the outside. He used stock, which he’d been counseling against for years. And then he said that… There were going to be synergies, which he’d previously said the year before or in the years before, were like justifications that management teams used to do any acquisition that they want to because synergies will emerge.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: And that was sort of misunderstood by the market in the moment. But I think in retrospect, it was obvious why he wanted to do that deal. And it was mostly because Berkshire had taken a very big position in Coca-Cola in the early 1990s, late 1980s, and that had appreciated an enormous amount.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: They’d put a third of the capital of Berkshire into Coke, and Coke had gone up like 14 times by the end of the 2000s. So it was a very substantial part of Berkshire’s net worth, and it was trading at like 60 times earnings. And so people have said, why didn’t Buffett sell that Coca-Cola holding? Because it basically did nothing for…
TOBIAS CARLISLE: The next 20 something years. And I realized that he did do something, which is that he sold it by partially selling Berkshire and buying Genree. And Genree had a different portfolio to the one that Berkshire had. Genree’s portfolio was all bonds. They don’t always rally into stock market crashes, but they have at certain times.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: And so he had this big bond portfolio. So Berkshire bought Genry and they issued stock in Berkshire to Genry holders, which had the effect of diluting down the stock, the Coke stock position very substantially. And introducing a whole lot of bonds.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: And then when the 2000 stock market crash happened, which we all remember that as a dot-com crash, but the reality of it was it was a large growth market, very similar to the one that we’re in now, where Walmart was not a tech stock, but Walmart became very expensive and crashed somewhat similar to the way it is now. Coke wasn’t a tech stock, it was just a large growth stock and it was overvalued.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: And so there were lots of these large growth stocks. Berkshire itself was three times book value. And then when the market crashed on the other side, the bonds rallied. Berkshire Buffett was able to sell off the bonds, redeploy that into equities. And so it was a defensive acquisition that protected them from the stock market crash that happened.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: And it set them up for the next 25 years after that because they didn’t draw down as much. They had the capital there. They diluted down the stock position. It was a… It was a masterful deal. And then he just sort of criticized the deal constantly afterwards because he said it introduced the weapons of mass destruction, the financial weapons of mass destruction.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: And he started warning about the risks of those derivatives contracts where both sides could claim to be profitable on a derivatives contract where it’s a bet that one side’s going to pay the other.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: So clearly they were doing some mismarking of those Mark-to-model rather than Mark-to-market. Buffett started warning about it. And so everybody remembers, well, the deal was just weapons of mass financial destruction. And so I thought it just needed, I just wanted to correct the record a little bit and sort of point out that it was a very interesting deal.
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: No, it was. And as was BNSF, which, of course, is one I remember. And I wasn’t really very close to the Genry deal. And I remember at the time people were very puzzled. No.
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: I slightly disagreed. You said in the book that people didn’t really appreciate the quality of the railroads. But I think, you know, I remember having looked at the railroads and thinking, oh, right, well, actually, these are now much better businesses.
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: And I don’t think it was, I think it was received wisdom in the stock market. I mean, I think Buffett sort of spotted something that other people hadn’t spotted. I mean, Chris Hone had bought a huge position in CSX in a couple of years earlier. I can’t remember exactly when he took the position, 2006, 2007.
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: But what interests me is the stock market didn’t quite get that deal because they felt that he was overpaying. And I just wondered, do you think that Buffett had understood that there was a duration in the railroads that perhaps the stock market hadn’t? Just the stock market had re-rated them.
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: There’s a limit to how much of a re-rating you can get in a period, right? So they’d been very lowly valued. Now they’re a bit higher valued. They were still even paying a premium and they were still cheap. Do you think that’s what he saw?
TOBIAS CARLISLE: I have to think about that a little bit. I think that, I think from my perspective, I had been, and some of this is, you know, the book is mine, so it’s a little bit personal, but I hadn’t fully appreciated, I think, the improvement in the railroads. I think that I was still reading Buffett as the high return on equity compounder investor.
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: And that’s why you got criticized, right?
TOBIAS CARLISLE: It was kind of a violation. Yeah, it was a violation of that idea because these were clearly very capital intensive. And I certainly remember seeing that criticism of it at the time.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: And I think subsequently it turned out, someone did an analysis a few years afterwards where they, excuse me, they pointed out that he had pulled out like most of his capital, half of his capital in very short order, which sort of made it into a, you know, he had very little, he had much less risk. And he had access to this, he controlled this enormous CapEx, regulated return on CapEx sort of empire that.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: Made the deal strategically brilliant, even though it didn’t follow what he had previously been doing.
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: I wondered if going through his mind was, I know that I’m going to be generating a lot more cash in five and 10 years and 15 years time, and I know that I’m going to struggle to find a home for it. So adding another very capital intensive business, it sounded illogical back in 2009. But he was thinking 10 years ahead. Do you think that’s what it was?
TOBIAS CARLISLE: Must have been. Must have been. I think he said as much. I think he said as much many times that he wanted to tie up.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: Some of the capital expenditure decisions were going to be made, necessitated by the railway, and they were going to get a regulated return on them of like 10%. And that was at a time when interest rates were near zero. So 10% regulated return was pretty good. And he issued stock again for BNSF. I mean, that was partly to tempt the retail holders who could roll over their gains. And it was also because he probably wanted the cash because he didn’t have, I don’t know, it was a $44 billion deal and he owned 25% or something, so 23%. So it was like almost always cash would have been used if he hadn’t used stock.
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: Do you think there’s any any anything else behind it because he’s been very loath to issue stock mr Buffett unless he’s getting a good deal.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: I think he’s but i think he said he’s made a few mistakes where he’s like bought i think he bought brown shoes with stock and that was probably a mistake and he’s talked about how that was a mistake but probably with BNSF it was the right it was the right move i think he just said that he doesn’t i think he just uses as a rule don’t issue stock but then If the deal is good enough, then it’s acceptable to do it.
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: And the Japanese trading houses, I mean, I was talking to somebody who had been to visit him, a Japanese expert. And he said that he found the Japanese trading houses by wading through the Japanese version of Value Line. And he found these stocks. And that’s what provoked him. And it was really looking in Japan because it was a cheap market.
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: What I think is quite interesting is why did he do it at that point? Because, you know, Japan had been cheap for, I don’t know how long, I mean, 20 years it had been cheap. I mean, is he just a master market technician? He’s just read that this is the time to do it now, or do you think he’s doing it in such size that he makes himself right? I mean, what was it? What was your prognosis?
TOBIAS CARLISLE: I think that he could see that they could issue yen denominated bonds at near zero and get a diversified income stream from each of these and then they diversified by bike like each one of the those conglomerates is pretty diversified and then you buy five so you’ve got extreme diversification and they they’re all paying dividends that far exceeded i think they’re like 7, 8, 9% dividend yields.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: And he was able to borrow in yen at zero and near zero in other instances. And so he just, that’s a Buffett kind of deal where you’ve got capital coming, your capital carried on that position. And so he was earning $600 million a year on the spread between the dividends and the cost to finance it. And so I think he just thought it was a… Capital coming back in, capital compounding in a holding. That’s a Buffett-Style deal.
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: And the Apple deal, I mean, you know, in the past they’d been loath to invest in tech companies. Do you think he broke his own rules? What do you think made him change his mind that he invested in Apple?
TOBIAS CARLISLE: He characterizes that as a consumer franchise. And once people sort of enter into that ecosystem, of have a laptop, have a desktop, have a iPhone, have a iPod. I mean, the earpods, you just sort of, you pay a little premium, you stay in that ecosystem, it’s hard to come back out again. I think the phone’s so popular, it’s a Trojan horse for everything else.
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: Yeah.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: And I think he said that he figured out that people would rather get rid of their second car than… Get rid of their phone when he asked his grandkids. Or get rid of their first car, I think.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: I think Apple had been on this, like, when they brought out a new phone, they tended to do quite well. And then they had this period in between where people forgot that they brought out phones on a periodic basis. And so I wrote about it. When we released Quantitative Value in 2012, one of the examples that we gave was the best name in that screen was Apple.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: We wrote a little… Paper about it immediately after it came out. And that was before Icahn and Einhorn had their run at Apple. And then it got cheap again in the interim and then Buffett showed up buying it. So I think that Apple’s one of those stocks that it used to have this sort of 2013, 2016, 2019, 2020, that kind of period.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: It went from being everybody sees it as this dominant stock to being, maybe it’s in decline. It’s a dominant stock. Maybe it’s in decline. I think that sort of pattern has gone away a little bit, but persisted for a while there in between iPhone releases.
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: And the most recent investment, you know, Berkshire Cornerstone in Alphabet, its recent innovative $80-$85 billion fundraising, I think they got a 6% discount. It seems a very different move. You know, Munger was talking about how they’d seen insurance companies spend so much money on Google Ads, but they hadn’t made the connection to buying the stock.
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: I just was wondering, I mean… I haven’t seen much comment about this, but it seems to me like a radical change of strategy because this is investing in tech, in AI, which seems very distant from what Mr. Ruff has done in the past. I can’t imagine that Greg Abel just spent $10 billion without mentioning it. What do you make of this?
TOBIAS CARLISLE: Yeah, it’s a pipe, right? A public investment, private investment in public equity. Right at the very top of the market in a hot name. I think it probably ticks all of the other criteria. Google’s very dominant, and Google probably is the best positioned company in this whole AI kind of… There’s a little bit of uncertainty about what it all looks like after the fact. We don’t know how people are going to… Spend. It looks like we’re all going to have our own AIs and pay for those AIs.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: We don’t know how commoditized they’re going to be. It looks like you can have a frontier model and spend a lot on it, or you can have some of these older models that they’re still pretty good and they’re basically cost-free. They’re basically free.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: It’s not clear how it all works out, but it seems like Google probably is well-positioned because they can integrate it across their product sweep more easily than anybody else. So probably From that perspective, it’s a good bet. Is the price a good price?
TOBIAS CARLISLE: I don’t know. It could have got it cheaper the last few years. But, you know, you don’t get to go back in time. You only get to make the decision now. I think it’s a big departure from what Berkshire has traditionally done. It doesn’t seem like there’s a particularly sweetheart deal there, and it seems like they’re closer to the top of the market in the short term anyway. It’s not bombed out by any stretch of the imagination.
SPEAKER 3: I mean… There hasn’t been sort of an outcry. Oh, my goodness, what’s Greg Abel doing? You know, if you’d told me that this was what was going to happen, I would have said, oh, well, everybody’s going to be very upset. But have you seen a lot of criticism?
TOBIAS CARLISLE: No.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: Maybe it’s the size. It’s not that big relative to the cash holdings that they have. Hang on.
SPEAKER 3: You know, $10 billion here, $10 billion there. It soon adds up.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: That’s true. It adds up.
SPEAKER 3: I mean, this is. As big a deal as you could do in a secondary placement.
SPEAKER 3: I don’t think you can say it’s not a very serious sum that you would think very long and hard. Even a company the scale of Berkshire Hathaway, you would not want to make a mistake with a $10 billion deal.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: Anyway, I don’t disagree.
SPEAKER 3: Yeah. So, look, you have an amazing podcast where you sit down or stand up every week. I wondered, has that had any effect on your own investing process? Are there any sort of guests or conversations you’ve gone, oh, you know, I should change the way I’m doing that?
TOBIAS CARLISLE: Yes. Partially, it’s been the period of time that we’ve lived through. It’s been very much a growth.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: I was probably more towards the junk end of the quality scale, and I would have argued that that would be the place to be.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: Now, I think that you need to be a little bit more agnostic about where you are in the quality scale. I think that I will buy better quality companies if I can get my price in them.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: I think that some companies are worth paying up for. And I think that that’s a result of having many conversations about, you know, most investors these days tend to be closer to the higher quality and there are fewer more traditional value investors who aren’t necessarily looking for compounders who are just trying to get a pretty good risk adjusted return out of what is there.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: So that was, that’s the main one I probably evolved on, on quality. I would have been a more dyed in the wool, you know, genuine deep value. Distressed investor.
SPEAKER 3: Was there anybody in particular that sort of pushed you in that direction? I mentioned earlier Stuart our mutual friend who you grew up in the same small town managed to produce two well-known and investors. I mean, he’s a big quality guy. I mean, are there any of the guests that have pushed you in that direction? Stuart pushed you in that direction?
TOBIAS CARLISLE: Collectively, I would say that that is true. I mean, I’m more of a, I like to read the research. So I would say that there’s a good paper by Cliff Asness and some of the other guys at AQR called Quality Minus Junk. Yeah. And I don’t necessarily…
TOBIAS CARLISLE: Agree with the way that they put the scoring system together at the end but that doesn’t matter i think they were just sort of making that understandable for anybody trying to use this in a systematic basis and to explain how they did the the research but basically the idea is that they say that there is a quality premium in the sense that there’s a quality factor in the sense the quality does generate returns that are independent of valuation and the market doesn’t pay up enough for some of these quality names.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: But the quality is not what is popular. It’s not the most visible company. It’s not necessarily, there’s a lot of, I think, misconceptions about what quality is. And they just sort of explain what it is in the sense that it is high returns on assets, high returns on equity, low variability of those returns, and then reasonable growth of those returns.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: And I think if you, if you You can be a quality investor and ignore valuation and you will get the returns that there do seem to be sort of excess returns to quality because it seems to be underappreciated by the market.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: The market doesn’t pay up for it enough, funnily enough, in some instances. But if you marry it with valuation, so they give quality at a reasonable price and they use this method where they’re looking for the highest, the companies that are in the…
TOBIAS CARLISLE: Top half of quality in the market and then they’re looking for it and this is in each industry and then they’re looking at companies that are in the bottom half of valuation for each industry and i would just say try to value the quality and then try and buy at a discount to that which is that’s basically what value traditional value investing is and so that’s i i kind of try i want to use the i want to use the research version where it’s explicit about what those rules are and include that in my own process.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: And so that’s what I’ve done. I just try to get a good discount for the quality that’s on offer.
SPEAKER 3: I mean, I think if they were writing that paper today, it might be slightly different because obviously quality has had a pretty difficult few years. Well, it’s interesting. On the podcast.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: I did look at that. So I looked at that. The paper came out in 2016 and I looked at how it’s performed since. And one of the things they talk about there is the price of quality. When quality becomes expensive, it tends to underperform. When quality becomes cheap, it tends to outperform.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: We’re in a period now where quality is really cheap, but the path for quality getting cheap is quality underperforming. So we’ve spent a decade where basically quality and value haven’t worked very well, and the intersection of them hasn’t worked very well either, relative to the market, which has been driven by market capitalization as being one of the main drivers of outperformance.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: So bigger companies have outperformed. There are lots of theories for why that might be, but I think one of them is just that if you look, there are long cycles where this happens. It’s not the first time it’s happened. It’s happened six times.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: Last one ended at the end of the last millennium, and then we had 15 years of pretty good value quality outperformance to 2015. I think there’s a reasonable chance that we’re at the end of another long market capitalization growth value period, and we’ve got some good times coming for value and quality.
SPEAKER 3: Well, you’re a patient guy. You’ve waited long enough.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: 15, 16 years.
SPEAKER 3: So just on the podcast, I mean, who is your favorite guest? Or who’s the one you’ve invited back most often?
TOBIAS CARLISLE: That’s a good question. Maybe Chris Bloomstrand’s been on a few times.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: Tim Travis has been on a few times. I’m big fans of both of those guys. They’re probably investors that are similar.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: Similar to me it’s not why i put them on just i often overlap with with Chris independently and and tim independently of we don’t really discuss the positions because i i prefer to just be driven by the financials but we often overlap and stuff that’s like a little bit off the run it’s not necessarily the highest quality it’s just good quality at the price and is there anybody that you’ve sort of been desperate to have on they’ve said no you Uhhhh…
TOBIAS CARLISLE: I’ve… I’m trying to think. I can’t think of anybody who we’ve pushed hard to come on. Often they’re just I would like to find guys who are less well-known and get them on to discuss what they do. And sometimes those guys just they don’t do any podcasts. They haven’t ever done any podcasts. And so I just want to be the first person to get them on and talk to them. So no.
SPEAKER 3: What made you want to do it live? Have you always done it live? No.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: No. No, that started in the pandemic because the markets were moving so fast. We’d record something and then release it a few days later and it was just out of…
TOBIAS CARLISLE: This is when we were doing more of a discussion between the three of us rather than having a different guest. I’ve had guests on. I used to do interviews and have guests. And then we did the… Sorry, I used to have interviews and then there were three of us who discussed the markets.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: And that three of us discussing the markets was the most popular version of it. And we did that live. And then I decided to do the interviews live as well. And it’s been fun. I like doing it live. I think it’s the best way to do it.
SPEAKER 3: Yeah, no, I think it’s good. I mean, I guess it would be slightly nerve-wracking if you’ve never done it before. I mean, I’ve done it, so, you know.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: It is nerve-wracking.
SPEAKER 3: But it is like, yeah, I mean, obviously the thing is You’ve got to be…
SPEAKER 3: Quite careful about what you say because it’s quite easy to you know i i lapse into swearing or being rude about people and then you know you can’t can’t do that now look you are obviously very well read the soldier of fortune book i mean it’s not just about Sun Tzu you quote from cicero there was an 18th century spanish book i think oh yeah yeah the what what non-investment book or ideas that most influenced you in looking at markets?
TOBIAS CARLISLE: Yeah, that’s a funny question.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: I like ancient literature, and I like and, of course, most of the translations are all free and available online too, which is the best part of it. You can go and read famous translations of famous old books and enjoy them. I like the Balthasar. Grassian has this, I like the Machiavelli, Grassian, who they say is Machiavelli with a soul.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: And Grassian is the one who, it’s his sins of omission rather than sins of commission that Buffett quotes. And so if you find the Grassian, Grassian’s got like a hundred or so of these little, maybe it’s more than that, maybe it’s 300 of these little like aphorisms, which are there. I have fun reading them.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: So I would say Gratians right up there. Somebody recommended Gratians. I hadn’t appreciated this. I talked about the sins of omission and commission in a different context, and somebody heard that and said, oh, that’s Gratian, contacted me and said, that’s Gratian. And I said, oh, that’s funny because I thought that was I’ve only heard it from Buffett, so I only knew it as Buffett’s.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: And then if you read Gratian, then Gratian similarly is very sort of Sun Tzu-Ish. I also read the Sun Tzu comes from this heritage of, it was the Chinese Enlightenment where they wrote the Tao Te Ching, The Way and Its Power, and the Zhuangzi, which is another book about Taoism.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: And then The Art Of War is a book about Taoism as well. And so if you read these books, they’re similar ideas to a lot of the Enlightenment writing in the West. From a different perspective, but probably written in a more lyrical, kind of more poetic, interesting way of reading them. So I just, I like those books.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: I think that anything that, probably The Art Of War is the one that’s influenced me the most as an investor, but all of those books are great because they have these, often you’ll find the same turn of phrase used, and clearly one’s been influenced by the other. And I think that’s kind of interesting to see that heritage.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: I think there are some powerful ideas in there.
SPEAKER 3: Interesting how these sort of ideas run in parallel and cycles. I’ve just read that book, Peak Human, and it goes through different enlightenments and different ages.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: Interesting.
SPEAKER 3: And how everything is parallel. It’s really fun. Any investment books that you’ve enjoyed?
TOBIAS CARLISLE: Yeah, I like The Making of an American Capitalist, which is the Roger Lowenstein book about… Buffett because I think that describes how he evolved as an investor and the snowball, which is just the more in-depth version of that.
SPEAKER 3: And listen, it’s great to talk to you. If people, where can people find you? I mean, you’re pretty easy to find, but.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: Yeah, I’m on Twitter at Greenback, G-R-E-E-N-B-A-C-K-D, or just search my name. It’ll probably come up.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: I post little charts and things there all the time. So I use Twitter as my main sort of blogging, micro blogging site. And then we have the podcast, Acquire’s podcast, Value After Hours.
SPEAKER 3: Don’t listen to that. Just fit it into the schedule.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: Listen on two times speed. And then the funds are ZIG, which is my mid-cap, large-cap, domestic, US equities, and deep, small, and micro. Acquire as funds, manages both of those. You never want to ask the barber if you need a haircut, but I do think that it is a good time for small value. I would much rather be a small value guy over the next 10 or 20 years than a large growth guy.
SPEAKER 3: Well, we’re recording this soon after the SpaceX IPO, and experience tells us that a wave of large IPOs like this usually coincides with near the top of the market. Nobody’s thinking that this is the absolute top, could go on for a long, long time. We don’t know, but it’s quite interesting.
SPEAKER 3: The whole AI thing, I mean, it’s obvious that this is very different from previous cycles, that the technology is all pervasive. But the amounts of money being thrown around just are mind-blowing. I don’t know. I mean, have you got any thoughts on that?
TOBIAS CARLISLE: Could be an enormous consumer surplus. Could be great for consumers. I think those AIs are incredible. They’re really fun to use. They’re very, very powerful. There’s a lot of stuff you can do with them. They’re clearly very useful.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: I think it’s like having a smart assistant. It’s like having an assistant with an MBA who really knows what they’re doing. They’re not always right. They make mistakes. You need some level of understanding about what you’re talking about to use them properly, I think.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: But I can see why there’s so much excitement about them. They’re going to be very important. They’re going to allow lay people to code. And to write software to get business systematized. And we’ve already seen individuals create billion-dollar companies in very short periods of time.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: I don’t think we’ve seen the full power of them yet because there’ll be guys out there who’ll create business systems to run gigantic enterprises with only a handful of people in them. So I think that it’s going to be incredibly powerful, but… So there’s a price at which all of that makes sense and there’s a price at which it doesn’t. And I think we’re probably at the more expensive end of the market.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: I think the picks and shovels guys are having a, they’re over-earning at the moment, let’s say. I think the semis are over-earning. I think some of those, the excitement there will look a little bit, I think the growth looks secular and it’s going to be a little bit more cyclical than it appears.
SPEAKER 3: Well, listen, Toby, it’s always a pleasure to talk to you. Thank you so much.
TOBIAS CARLISLE: Thanks for having me, Steve. I appreciate it.
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: Well, I hope you enjoyed our conversation. Toby is an incredibly thoughtful investor and has not been afraid to develop his investment philosophy over time. He’s a young family, runs a couple of funds, produces a high-quality podcast each week, and somehow still finds time to write books. I don’t know how he manages that. I wish I could. Until next time, thanks for listening.
DISCLAIMER: Behind the Balance Sheet and affiliates and podcast guests may own shares or have an economic interest in securities discussed in this podcast, which is aired for your education and entertainment only. Nothing in this podcast should be construed as investment advice or relied upon for investment decisions. Always do your own research.
STEPHEN CLAPHAM: Thank you for listening. I hope you enjoyed this episode. It would mean a great deal to me if you could please share this with just one friend and feel free to spread the word by subscribing or even leaving a review on Apple Podcasts or Spotify. Thank you for your support.